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Abstract

Aeroecological processes, especially powered flight of animals, can rapidly
connect biological communities across the globe. This can have profound
consequences for evolutionary diversification, energy and nutrient transfers,
and the spread of infectious diseases. The latter is of particular consequence
for human populations, since migratory birds are known to host diseases which
have a history of transmission into domestic poultry or even jumping to human
hosts. In this chapter, we present a scenario under which a highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) strain enters North America from East Asia via postmolting waterfowl migration. We use an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate
the movement and disease transmission among 106 generalized waterfowl
agents originating from ten molting locations in eastern Siberia, with the HPAI
seeded in only ~102 agents at one of these locations. Our ABM tracked the
disease dynamics across a very large grid of sites as well as individual agents,
allowing us to examine the spatiotemporal patterns of change in virulence of the
HPAI infection as well as waterfowl host susceptibility to the disease. We
concurrently simulated a 12-station disease monitoring network in the northwest
USA and Canada in order to assess the potential efficacy of these sites to detect
and confirm the arrival of HPAI. Our findings indicated that HPAI spread was
initially facilitated but eventually subdued by the migration of host agents. Yet,
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during the 90-day simulation, selective pressures appeared to have distilled the
HPAI strain to its most virulent form (i.e., through natural selection), which was
counterbalanced by the host susceptibility being conversely reduced (i.e.,
through genetic predisposition and acquired immunity). The monitoring network
demonstrated wide variation in the utility of sites; some were clearly better at
providing early warnings of HPAI arrival, while sites further from the disease
origin exposed the selective dynamics which slowed the spread of the disease
albeit with the result of passing highly virulent strains into southern wintering
locales (where human impacts are more likely). Though the ABM presented had
generalized waterfowl migration and HPAI disease dynamics, this exercise
demonstrates the power of such simulations to examine the extremely large
and complex processes which comprise aeroecology. We offer insights into how
such models could be further parameterized to represent HPAI transmission
risks as well as how ABMs could be applied to other aeroecological questions
pertaining to individual-based connectivity.

1

Introduction

Movement through the air, once achieved, could be perceived as an entry to all
areas of the world touched by the wind. The barriers that affect biological connectivity in terrestrial or aquatic ecosystems are much less pronounced in wide-open
skies. Yet, the air column and dynamic processes therein which comprise the
“aerosphere” present their own ecological pressures, which can dictate the flow
of volant organisms relative to the underlying landscape, other airborne species and
materials, and the airmass itself. In the case of vertebrates, sustained movements
through the aerosphere are the result of powered flights where the direction,
duration, and daily distance traveled are both intrinsically and extrinsically controlled. The balance between a genetically mediated migratory program and phenotypic flexibility produces complex interactions that further mediate the flight
behaviors of vertebrates. The ease with which a species can transverse a landscape
springs from the sum effect of piecemeal decisions (Taylor et al. 1993). Because of
this, characterizing the movements of a species or population likely requires that we
examine flight through the aerosphere at the lowest denominator: the individual
(Morales et al. 2010).
Advances in tracking individuals using technology such as light-level archival
geolocators, satellite transmitters, GPS tags, and tissue stable isotope analyses have
begun to reveal much about individual variation and population patterns in vertebrate flight behavior (Cooke et al. 2004; Hobson and Norris 2008; Robinson et al.
2010; Bridge et al. 2011; McKinnon et al. 2013; Kays et al. 2015) or, possibly,
in-flight physiology (Gumus et al. 2015). However, scaling such efforts to more
widely encompassing levels remains logistically challenging if not prohibitively
expensive (Cagnacci et al. 2010; Hebblewhite and Haydon 2010). Because of this,
current endeavors to track individual movements may be restricted in their ability to
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broadly represent movement behavior variation throughout species’ regional or
range-wide populations. Data-informed models of individual movements within a
simulation framework show promise in filling otherwise-unreachable knowledge
gaps regarding biological phenomena (DeAngelis and Mooij 2005; Tang and
Bennett 2010). Relevant to this volume is how vertebrates move through the
aerosphere and, by extension, the ease with which optimized flight strategies can
connect populations and biological communities across broad spatial scales
(Alerstam 2011).
The implications of better resolving individual movements through the
aerosphere as a component of geographic connectivity are likely to enhance various
biological disciplines: from evolution, landscape ecology, conservation biology,
resource management, and behavior to broadly integrative macrosystem studies.
For instance, it is generally thought that capacity for long-distance flight often
reduces the impermeability of landscape features that would otherwise be barriers
to species with greater movement restrictions (Wiens 1976; Taylor et al. 1993),
including non-migratory birds (Harris and Reed 2002). Because of this, flying
animals with expansive ranges such as migratory birds are often found to show
only modest, if any, phylogeographic variation (Zink 1996; Sutherland et al. 2000;
von R€
onn et al. 2016). Yet, in many cases migratory constraints within a species
appear to have contributed to some degree of geographic diversification (see
Chap. 11; Irwin 2002; Pérez-Tris et al. 2004; Delmore and Irwin 2014). By
simulating potentially subtle barriers to migratory and breeding dispersal using
agent-based models (ABMs; alternatively, “individual-based models”), we may
have the opportunity to uncover evolutionarily significant patterns within highly
vagile species. This includes integrating the available information about the species’ migratory biology and simulating probable real-world scenarios (Bowlin et al.
2010; MacPherson and Gras 2016).
ABM simulations extend our ability to model natural phenomena to include
complex interactions among multiple different types of agents. These may include
vector agents that are capable of traversing the simulation arena or static agents that
occupy the same spatial arena but may dynamically change during the simulation
(e.g., a vegetated area which sprouts, blooms, seeds, and senesces over time). Since
ABMs can be tailored to any geographic or temporal scale, even slow-developing
or locally subtle patterns among agent interactions can be examined, despite the
complexity of ecological or evolutionary processes. For example, the seasonal flow
of energy and nutrients as a result of animal migration may be difficult to quantify
using standard field techniques, since the deposition of waste or carcasses are
relatively rarely detected events (outside of huge aggregation sites). Yet, we
understand that migratory birds regularly move through the aerosphere to exploit
seasonal pulses of resources (Alerstam et al. 2003; Bowlin et al. 2010;
Shariatinajafabadi et al. 2014; Si et al. 2015), and so the influx and exodus of
billions of individuals, with associated depredations and depositions along the way,
certainly must collectively have a nontrivial impact in terms of the redistribution of
energy and nutrients (Bauer and Hoye 2014). A properly parameterized ABM could
not only outline what this redistribution might entail at stopover sites, it may also
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predict what transitory impacts this may have where migratory flight paths aggregate over otherwise unsuitable stopover habitat (e.g., over open water of the Great
Lakes region of North America).
Perhaps the most pressing cause for studying connectivity among species and the
landscape is the potential threat posed by continental-scale transmission of highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) via migratory birds. These long-distance
migrants may be the primary conduit by which certain diseases could traverse
continents and jump dispersal barriers, such as mountain ranges or oceans. HPAI
is of particular concern because recent outbreaks among domestic fowl in East
Asia, Europe, and North America were thought to be mediated by wild birds
(Okazaki et al. 2000; Hulse-Post et al. 2005; Gilbert et al. 2006; Kilpatrick et al.
2006; Alexander and Brown 2009; Feare 2010). This disease is also naturally
prevalent in the environment (Winker and Gibson 2010), and it shows high transmissibility, morbidity, mutability, and potential for jumping to mammalian hosts
(Kapan et al. 2006; Olsen et al. 2006; Taubenberger and Kash 2016). A worst-case
scenario is that a virulent HPAI strain capable of switching hosts to infect human
populations becomes spread across a wide landscape through the flights of wild
birds (Tan et al. 2015). Countering disease transmission and host switching is best
accomplished through a coordinated detection-and-response network (Wagner et al.
2001; Jebara 2004; Choffnes et al. 2007; Silkavute et al. 2013; Xu et al. 2013). As
with any threat to human life, early and accurate detection of a disease is critical if
mitigation is to be effective. These actions may include quarantines or inoculations
of potentially exposed humans or similar measures among possible animal vectors,
with the additional option of population culls of domestic fowl or hazing wild host
populations (DeLiberto et al. 2011; Wobeser 2013).
Best management practices dictate that limited pools of funding should be
directed to maximize the intended outcome. In the case of HPAI monitoring, this
hinges upon one critical need: to detect the disease while there remains an opportunity to halt an outbreak. This “make-or-break” scenario puts tremendous pressure
on monitoring agencies to have an expansive focus and to swiftly and accurately
diagnose HPAI in the field. Accomplishing this task naively would necessitate a
costly outpouring of resources just to capture the earliest signs of disease infiltration
or host shifting. Coordinated monitoring networks, such as the United States
Geological Service’s Wildlife Health Information Sharing Partnership event
reporting system (WHISPers; https://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/whispers/), show great
promise at early detection of HPAI, although the efficacy of these endeavors is still
reliant upon sufficient sampling, accuracy, and timely reporting by field observers.
Fail-safe disease monitoring regimes can not only be expensive and challenging
to coordinate, but may be also difficult to grade for accuracy and efficacy. The static
models and formulas currently used to determine sampling needs for detecting a
disease hinge upon uncertainty parameters which can be broad (e.g., severity of
exposure events, distribution and virulence of zoonotic infective source; Yang et al.
2007). In many cases, the assessments of how well monitoring regimes are actually
functioning have mostly been limited to preparedness indicator surveys (ECDC
2007; Azziz-Baumgartner et al. 2009) or, when the system fails, a retroactive
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assessment of shortcomings (Balicer et al. 2007; Scallan 2007). As a low-cost and
promising alternative, ABM simulations may be a useful tool for making proactive
assessments of HPAI monitoring networks and possibly optimizing their effectiveness relative to cost. With this in mind, we have constructed a realistic ABM which
simulates a hypothetical HPAI transmission into North America from Asia and
concordantly tests the efficacy of a theoretical monitoring network to detect the
disease before it has progressed to an outbreak stage.
The ABM presented in this chapter incorporates underlying biological principles
related to both large-scale bird migration and the Susceptible-Exposed-InfectedRecovered (SEIR) model of disease dynamics (Keeling and Rohani 2008). However, instead of using static population-level metrics within the SEIR model, we
have leveraged the power of the ABM simulation framework to allow the SEIR
factors to dynamically evolve during the course of the simulation. This is likely to
more accurately reflect the reality in nature, since viruses such as avian influenza
have the capacity to rapidly mutate into more virulent strains just as their hosts have
the capacity to alter their individual susceptibility and/or probability of recovery
through acquired immunity (Bourouiba et al. 2011; Pybus et al. 2013). In effect, our
ABM is designed to parameterize the probability of low-incidence, high-risk
disease transmission that would otherwise be difficult to trace, even from extensive
sampling regimes. Such a model is not only informed by existing knowledge but
can, in turn, guide future empirical studies by exposing knowledge gaps (Harris
et al. 2015), aeroecological limiting factors (Lam et al. 2012), or critical nodes
within disease monitoring networks (Ferguson et al. 2006; Boyce et al. 2009).
Our entire case-study simulation is couched under the topic of this chapter—the
aerosphere as a connector—to illustrate how animal movement through the air may
(or may not) facilitate rapid translocations and can effectively reduce the ecological
divisiveness of what would otherwise be impenetrable geographic boundaries,
resulting in the mixing of biological agents over large geographic extents. Building
upon the paradigm of ABM operation described in Chap. 11, we now demonstrate
how movement through the aerosphere can drive interspecific dynamics in the form
of intercontinental spread of disease.

2

Constructing the Agent-Based Model

The applicability of models of increasing complexity depends upon how well their
core components are built to emulate the processes of study. Building an ABM—
especially of something as complex as disease transmission, evolution, and monitoring during the intercontinental migration of a very large population of a
generalized waterfowl species—required that we first start with basic models of
agent movement and then added levels of increasing complexity in stages. In our
case, we built the ABM in the following five major stages:
1. Parameterize the autumn migration of a generalized “waterfowl” species
according to simple movement and stopover rules
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2. Include more complex rules for individual waterfowl stopover and aggregation
decisions
3. Add a transmissible waterfowl-borne viral disease (i.e., HPAI) as well as
individual variation in disease susceptibility among waterfowl agents
4. Incorporate mutability in HPAI virulence as well as waterfowl susceptibility as a
factor of exposure
5. Simulate hypothetical monitoring stations at predetermined locations (i.e.,
places likely to attract stopover that were relatively close to human settlements)
as the means to gauge the efficacy of single versus networked stations to detect
and confirm the HPAI outbreak
In the first stage of ABM development, we consulted basic knowledge about
general waterfowl migratory biology. We sourced this information from traditional
monitoring efforts, such as local field surveys, standardized mark-release-recapture
programs, and station-network monitoring (Bellrose and Crompton 1970; Flock
1972; Dau 1992; Moermond and Spindler 1997; Winker and Gibson 2010), as well
as individual tracking data gathered using modern technology (Ely et al. 1997;
Green et al. 2002; Mosbech et al. 2006; Alerstam et al. 2007; Gaidet et al. 2010;
Prosser et al. 2009, 2011; Krementz et al. 2012; Takekawa et al. 2010, 2013; Ely
and Franson 2014). From these collective data, we were able to broadly parameterize the timing of population movements, distributions of distances moved, and
stopover duration for the generalized waterfowl species being modeled. Since we
were not attempting to precisely model one species or replicate an exact situation,
our ABM was simply intended to be a starting point from which it can be tailored to
specific systems or questions in the future.
The ABM that we constructed was designed from the second stage onward to
include more complex daily movement and stopover rules, to introduce individual
variation, to model contagious disease dynamics (Brown et al. 2008; Gaidet et al.
2010), and to emulate what was the ultimate focus—evaluating the efficacy of a
network of monitoring stations to detect and confirm HPAI arrival by way of
aeroecological connections. Because species often have different mechanisms
driving large- (i.e., continental) versus small-scale (i.e., local) navigation (see
Chap. 6), we allowed for modest spatiotemporal shifts in migratory flight behavior
of the generalized waterfowl species throughout the migratory period. We also
incorporated simple rules to allow symptomatic birds to be more readily detected at
monitoring stations (Brown and Stallknecht 2008) and for both virus and host
agents to evolve as the simulation progressed and passed through the stages of
the SEIR model. Below we outline the final composition of our ABM which
incorporates additions from all five stages of model development.

2.1

Populating the Arena, Agents, and Disease

Our ABM focused on the individual movements of a generalized waterfowl species
during a hypothetical 90-day autumn migration period that connected birds between
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their molting locations in eastern Siberia to wintering grounds in the southern USA
or northern Mexico. This reflects a hypothetical situation where HPAI enters the
Americas via southward migration of arctic-breeding birds. The arena of possible
bird locations included an area extending from eastern Siberia to Iceland, Central
America, and Venezuela (Fig. 17.1). This area was projected to a Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area sphere centered on 100 W with latitude of origin at 45 N, which
provided a meter-based overlay of the area of interest. At 10 km intervals along
both the x- and y-axes, we plotted a grid of possible stopover locations for agents
during their migration. We excluded as possible stopover sites those grid points
positioned greater than 200 km from land, since the waterfowl agent simulated was
intended to prefer land and realistic disease monitoring capacity would be restricted
to the near-coast region.

Fig. 17.1 Map of ABM arena showing 10-km grid of possible stopover points (blue), starting
locations of uninfected agents (green), the population of disease origin (red), and 12 monitoring
stations (yellow; numbered according to Table 17.2). Rendering the large number of stopover grid
points at this scale has created an artificial distortion in the graphic
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To reduce processing time, we prepopulated properties for each grid point using
data from underlying landscape characteristics maps (Fig. 17.2). These “static
variables” included distance and direction to the closest ocean coastline, lakeshore,
and river, as well as elevation, anthropogenic biome types, and human disturbance
(Table 17.1A). We used these measures during the ABM simulations to allow
individual agents to assess the stopover sites to inform avoidance, attraction, and
settlement decisions when picking a stopover destination. We allowed certain
metrics for each grid point to dynamically change during the simulations, which
had implications for waterfowl agent stopover as well as HPAI transmission as the
ABM progressed. These metrics included daily values of the total number of
occupants, the number of diseased occupants, as well as the mean and standard
deviation of disease virulence among infected occupants at each grid point
(variables #1 through #4 in Table 17.1B; hereafter referenced in the format
“Table 17.1B [1–4]”). Also tracked were individual agent metrics of status (alive
and migrating), disease susceptibility, and the virulence and days of infection of any
carried HPAI strain (Table 17.1B [5–9]).
At the outset of the ABM (i.e., “Day 0”), the total number of starting agents (106)
was equally distributed across ten hypothetical molting areas in eastern Siberia
(Fig. 17.1). Our first introduction of variation into the simulation came during the
disease seeding process when we allowed the ABM to (1) randomly choose the
population where the disease originated; (2) randomly choose ~102 of the 105
occupants (i.e., 0.001 probability for any individual) at that population to be
infected; (3) randomly assign each individual’s disease susceptibility, regardless
of population or infection status (Table 17.1B [7]); (4) select an initial virulence for
each diseased individual from a gamma distribution (Table 17.1B [8]); and (5) randomly choose each infected individual’s preexisting day of infection from a gamma
distribution (Table 17.1B [9]).

Fig. 17.2 Layer data embedded into each grid point in preparation for the ABM simulation.
Shown atop the “Human Disturbance” layer is part of the 10-km grid of possible stopover locations
as well as an example neighborhood (outlined in blue) within which an agent would probabilistically select its final stopover location based upon relative weightings of distance to water, human
disturbance, and current density of agents

Predefined during ABM construction

[0] PointID

Grid matrix:
rows ¼ 844,
columns ¼ 1023
Origin(x, y):5,770,000, 3,930,000
(in meters)
Δx, Δy ¼ [Gridpoint(x, y)Origin(x, y)]/
10 km
PointID ¼ [Δy*columns] þ [Δxcolumns]

Source

Metric

Calculation

Identifier

A. Static variables
Grid points (stopover locations)

Proportionate attraction values
were calculated relative to the
total attraction across all features

where . . .
k: Coast ¼ 0.05; Lake ¼ 0.10;
River ¼ 0.20;
x0: Coast ¼ 125 km;
Lake ¼ 60 km; River ¼ 40 km

1þe

Attraction to: [2] Coasts/
[3] Lakes/[4] Rivers
n
o
1
PðattractionÞ ¼ 1 
½κðDistancex0 Þ

Coastlines: World continents
(ESRI 2012)
Lakeshores and riverbanks: North
American Atlas–Hydrography
(CEC 2010)

Water boundaries

Elevation

[7] Biome avert
(Ba)
Residential: 0.9
Cropland: 0.3
Rangeland: 0.5
Forest: 0.15
Barren: 1.0
Ocean: 0.9

Anthropogenic
biomes of the
world (Ellis and
Ramankutty
2008)

Anthropogenic
biome types

where . . .
where . . .
J ¼ elevation
J ¼ disturbance
at PointID,
at PointID,
k ¼ 0.75,
k ¼ 0.15,
x0 ¼ 3000
x0 ¼ 30
½8PðtAvoidÞ ¼ PðEa [ Da [ BaÞ  PðEa \ DaÞ
 


Ea \ Ba j Da  Da \ Ba j Ea

1þe

Global Human
North
Footprint
America
Dataset
elevation–
(WCS/CIESIN
1 km
2005)
resolution
(CEC 2007)
Avoidance of: [5] Elevation (Ea);
[6] Disturbance (Da)
n
o
1
PðavoidanceÞ ¼ 1 
½κðJx0 Þ

Human
disturbance

Iteratively—
assigned integers
within sequential
starting
populations (i.e.,
1–100,000 in
population #1,
100,001–200,000
in population #2,
etc.)

[9] BirdID

Assigned during
intiation of ABM

Identifiers

Waterfowl agents

Table 17.1 Summary of how static and dynamic variables used in the ABM were first derived/calculated and how the dynamic variables were updated as the
ABM progressed
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Calculation

Each grid point’s dynamic metrics were stored
as entries in an assigned ArrayList within a
LinkedHashMap

Recalculated among
contagious occupants
of grid point whenever
one enters, leaves
(by departure or death),
or becomes contagious
(infected 4 days)

[3] Mean [4] Std dev

Metric

[1] Total
[2] Contagious
Running totals
increased/decreased
iteratively upon
each entry/exit of
any agent (total) or
an agent infected
4þ days
(contagious)

Population disease
virulence

B. Dynamic variables
Grid points
Waterfowl
occupants

1
1þe½kðWx0 Þ

where . . .
k ¼ 0.1;
x0 ¼ 260;
W ¼ grid
row
containing
occupied
PointID

n

o

Probability of mortality/
ending migration increases
logistically as days infected/
southward position increases,
respectively

where. . .
k ¼ 0.9736;
x0 ¼ 7;
W ¼ days of
consecutive
infection

PðchangeÞ ¼ 1 

[5] Death [6] End migration

Status change probabilities

Waterfowl agents

Initial values randomly drawn from function:
P(scpt/vir/infDay) ¼ 1  [Gamma(α, β) – 2  f]
where . . . f ¼ 0;
where . . . f ¼ 0.1,
where . . .
α ¼ 6, β ¼ 1.5
α ¼ 6, β ¼ 15,
f ¼ 1.0, α ¼ 6,
(as integer)
Max ¼ 1.0, Min ¼ 0.1
β ¼ 15,
Max ¼ 1.0,
Min ¼ 0.0
Update number
Assign virulence from
Adjust
of successive
local metrics upon
susceptibility
days
infection
upon clearing
alive þ infected
disease of
virulence P(vir)
[10] P
[12] W0 ¼ W þ 1
[11] Vir0 ¼ [3] scaled
(scpt0 ) ¼ P
by random draw from
normal distribution
(scpt) *
(μ ¼ 1.0, σ ¼ 0.1)
[1  (Vir0 *2)];
min ¼ 0.0

[7] Susceptibility [8] Virulence [9] Infection day

Disease-host characteristics

Location

Sourced
from
underlying
grid point

[0] PointID
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Daily Disease Transmission, and Mortality

At the outset of each new day, we programmed each uninfected individual to
consult its current grid point metrics to determine the probability that it was
exposed to a contagious agent (i.e., infection day  4; Brown et al. 2008) given
that each individual, regardless of disease status, was arbitrarily set to randomly
experience exactly two density-independent interactions that would permit disease
transmission with the other occupant(s) of the population (e.g., close feeding
behaviors; Brown and Stallknecht 2008). If the agent was indeed exposed to a
contagious individual, the probability that it contracted the disease was contingent
on the susceptibility of the individual (Table 17.1B [7]) and, since the model did not
account for which contagious agent was contacted, the mean and standard deviation
of HPAI virulence at the population level (Table 17.1B [3,4]). Based upon a normal
distribution centered on this population mean virulence and scaled by the
accompanying population standard deviation, if a randomly drawn virulence
value exceeded the inverse value of the individual agent’s susceptibility, then we
set the infection day of the agent to 1. At the time of infection, the HPAI virus had
the ability to mutate according to a normally distributed multiplier (Table 17.1B
[11]). This meant that with every successful transmission, the HPAI strain could
become more or less virulent but was most likely to remain unchanged (i.e.,
multiplier of 1.0). We constructed the ABM to thereafter determine if the agent
would move to a new location.
Among waterfowl agents that were already diseased prior to the beginning of
each day, we provided the opportunity to clear their HPAI strain or, failing that, we
subjected these to an increasing probability of death prior to leaving their current
location. Our ABM dictated the probability of clearing the HPAI infection
according to three factors: (1) the virulence of the strain, (2) the susceptibility
(i.e., inverse resistance) of the individual waterfowl agent to HPAI, and (3) a
normally distributed multiplier with mean of 1.0 and standard deviation of 0.1. If
the virulence of the HPAI strain scaled by the random multiplier was less than the
inverse susceptibility of the individual agent, we allowed the agent to clear the
infection. When an HPAI strain was cleared, we adjusted the individual agent’s
susceptibility by a factor equivalent to the inverse of double the virulence of the
strain being cleared (Table 17.1B [10]). In other words, if a strain with a virulence
of 0.4 was cleared, the agent’s susceptibility would be 20% of what it had been [i.e.,
1  (0.4  2)] and clearing a strain with virulence of 0.5 or greater imparted
complete immunity upon the individual (i.e., new susceptibility ¼ 0). This would
allow agents to possibly develop immunity to reinfection, especially if they cleared
a particularly virulent strain of HPAI.
To simulate mortality in the population as a function of the day of infection, we
used a logistic function (Table 17.1B [5]). This calculation meant that the probability
of mortality rose with each subsequent day of infection, especially after the HPAI
became communicable on Day 4. Yet, this function also meant that even noncontagious individuals had a modestly increased likelihood of death, which allowed us to
ensure a background mortality among noninfected agents (i.e., infection day ¼ 0)
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equivalent to a 40% annual mortality in the absence of any disease (Franklin et al.
2002). If a randomly selected value between 0.0 and 1.0 fell below the infection
day-based probability of mortality, we removed the agent from the simulation and, if
it was infected, recorded upon its “death” the information about its HPAI strain’s
virulence (Table 17.1B [8 or 11]) and the number of sequential days it had been
infected (Table 17.1B [9 or 12]).

2.3

Daily Movements: Migration

There were two types of possible daily movements that our ABM allowed: longdistance migration or neighborhood searches. The former, which we kept as
relatively uncommon events (i.e., mean of 10-day stopover; Takekawa et al.
2010), led to the agent moving hundreds of kilometers in a semi-random fashion.
If our ABM selected the agent to migrate, then we drew a random bearing from a
normal distribution with mean 170 and standard deviation of 60 (Fig. 17.3).
Because of our map projection, the real-world compass direction of movement
changed as a function of geographic position; this meant that the agent would
generally move in an eastern and then south-southeastern direction from its molting
grounds to wintering grounds (see Fig. 17.1). We thereafter selected from a gamma
distribution [γ(α, β); α ¼ 6, β ¼ 0.015] a movement distance for the migrating
agent. On the rare occasion that the selected value exceeded 1200 km, we folded the

Fig. 17.3 Probability distributions for movement distances (base) and directions (inset) when
agents migrated. Distance was calculated from a gamma distribution folded on itself beginning
with distances above 1200 km. Direction was drawn from a normal distribution with mean of 170
and standard deviation of 60
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distribution back on itself [i.e., final distance ¼ (1200 km-selected distance) þ 1200 km] to prevent unrealistic travel distances (Fig. 17.3).
Prior to finalizing the movement of the agent, we programmed our ABM to
check whether the proposed stopping point was valid (i.e., would land the agent
within the arena and 200 km from land). If the movement was not valid, we set the
model to pick a new migratory bearing and distance and recheck the validity of this
new proposed movement. If a valid move could not be found after 100 attempts, we
denied the agent the ability to migrate and, instead, relegated it to exploring its
neighborhood for a more ideal location (see Sect. 2.4).
When an agent completed its migration, we set the ABM to relocate it to the
nearest grid point and assess whether this was a sufficiently suitable stopover
location. We based this site assessment upon a summation of logistic avoidance
functions for elevation and human disturbance (Table 17.1A [5, 6]), plus
predetermined avoidance measures for anthropogenic biome type (Table 17.1A
[7]). We then calculated the total probability of avoidance (tAvoid; Table 17.1A
[8]) as the overlapping probability across all three factors (i.e., probability of
avoiding any or all factors). If a random value drawn from 0.0 to 1.0 was less
than tAvoid, then we forced the agent to move toward a nearby water feature
(coastline, lake, or river) based upon the relative attraction of each from the current
point. We determined the probability of displacement to one of the three alternative
water feature boundaries using separate logistic functions of attraction for
coastlines, lakes, and rivers (Table 17.1A [2–4]). These values were each further
adjusted by separate weightings for each water type that we had predefined in the
model: in our case, 0.2, 0.8, and 0.5, respectively. We then scaled the relative
attraction to each water type against the total draw across all three water types, and
the resulting value was used to define successive bins of probable relocation to each
water type. Based upon which bin contained a random number drawn between 0.0
and 1.0, we selected the associated nearby water boundary to relocate the agent.

2.4

Daily Movements: Neighborhood Exploration

At either the end of the migratory jump and possible relocation or, if the agent did
not migrate, at the original point, we allowed the agent to explore its neighborhood
for a “more suitable” location. We defined a neighborhood as the agent’s current
location plus all surrounding grid points within 25 km (n ¼ 20, unless any grid
points fell outside the 200 km coastline buffer or the ABM arena; Fig. 17.2). We
determined the relative attractiveness of the neighborhood grid points (RelBWwt)
based upon a combination of avoidance of human disturbance (Da; Table 17.1A
[6]) and the maximum attraction to coast, lake, or river (maxWA; Table 17.1A
[2–4]), as well as the total agent occupants (tOcc; Table 17.1B [1]) relative to a
predefined optimum (OptD): in our case arbitrarily set at 1500 agents/grid point. In
each case, we defined an adjustment factor so that the weighting of each variable
could be given more or less importance (“b” for Da, “w” for maxWA, “q” for tOcc).
The RelBWwt value was precalculated for each grid point as:
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RelBWwt ¼

½ðDa∗ bÞ þ ðmaxWA∗ wÞ
bþwþq

Since tOcc was a dynamic value, this required recalculation each day. We also
used a slope factor ( f ) to more strongly weight tOcc as it approached OptD. We did
this so that density could vary more in its influence over how agents selected the
optimal point in the neighborhood. The resulting formula for density weight
(DENSwt) was:

DENSwt ¼


1=

jtOcc  OptDj
þ1
OptD∗ f 1

∗
q

The sum of DENSwt and RelBWwt provided a total weight for the grid point,
which we then scaled against the cumulative weight across all neighborhood grid
points to determine a relative bin size. We designated bins according to each one’s
sequential position in the neighborhood, and using a random draw from a uniform
distribution between 0.0 and 1.0, we selected the agent’s new point based upon the
bin in which this number fell.
Once a grid point was selected, we moved the agent to its new position and
accounted for it within the dynamic grid point metrics (Table 17.1B [1–4]).
Regardless of disease infection, we added every incoming agent to the tOcc tally.
We likewise added individuals diseased at least 4 days to the tally of occupants
likely to be contagious (cOcc; Brown et al. 2008) and then calculated a new mean
and standard deviation for HPAI virulence across all of the strains infecting
contagious individuals. We ensured that these new values for each metric could
only be consulted in the subsequent day and retained the day’s starting values so
that all subsequent disease transmission and migratory movements among the
remaining agents would remain unbiased. In this way, movement of a contagious
agent into a new population would not result in added probability of disease
exposure at this new location until the next day.
At the end of each simulated day, we recorded the total number of HPAIinfected, contagious, and dead individual agents so that we could track the overall
disease dynamics throughout the entire simulation arena. We likewise recorded on
each day the status of each agent in terms of being alive and/or in a migratory state,
its current grid point position (Table 17.1B [0]), its susceptibility to HPAI, as well
as metrics of its HPAI infection: day of infection and virulence of the strain (zeros if
not infected; Table 17.1B [7–12], where applicable). For each grid point we also
logged daily metrics, including number of occupants, number of contagious
occupants, and the mean and standard deviation of virulence across all HPAI strains
present (Table 17.1B [1–4]. Across the entire 90-day study period, we tracked the
distribution of all agents—as well as the subset of contagious agents—relative to
the location of the disease origin, in this case: N62.703, W167.117 (red dot in
Fig. 17.1). We calculated the median, quartile, and maximum distances among
these two groupings at 6-day intervals during the study period and determined the
day by which each measure exceeded the minimum distance from the origin of the
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disease to the contiguous USA (4200 km). These latter calculations were intended
to estimate how quickly the agents and the disease, respectively, could have
possibly reached population centers in the contiguous USA.

2.5

Simulating Monitoring Effort

To evaluate on-the-ground monitoring of disease connectivity, we established a
simulated network of monitoring stations at twelve grid points that were located at
potentially favorable stopover locations (i.e., relatively low-altitude lakes with little
human disturbance within 50 km of human settlements; Fig. 17.1). We allowed the
stations to sample daily within a 12.5 km radius of the station (i.e., a 3  3 block of
grid points) for signs of communicable HPAI in the agents present. Early-infected
agents that were not yet contagious were considered undetectable (i.e., asymptomatic during Days 1–3). To roughly account for density-dependent sampling coverage, we calculated the daily probability of disease detection [P(dd)] using the log10
value of tOcc as the base of a root function for the proportion of cOcc in the
population:
PðddÞ ¼

rﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
cOcc
tOcc

log10 tOcc

This calculation allowed for contagious individuals to experience a higher rate
of detection, especially within smaller populations (Brown and Stallknecht 2008).
To increase random effects into the probability of disease detection, we then
multiplied the resulting value by a normally distributed chance factor with mean
of 1.0 and standard deviation of 0.25. If this adjusted detection probability was
lower than a random number drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.0 and
1.0, then we determined that HPAI had been detected at this location. We repeated
this process 99 more times, each time drawing new chance and random factors.
Across all of these repetitions, we then were able to calculate an overall probability
of a single detection at each site on each day as the proportion of iterations that
produced a positive detection. We likewise calculated the probability of a single
detection across any station in the monitoring network. We further calculated the
probability of detecting at least one additional contagious agent within a 3-day
window (i.e., a “confirming detection”). We calculated this probability separately at
each site, as well as collectively across sites, the latter representing a network of
stations that would be sharing real-time updates of HPAI detections. This assumed
that diagnosis and reporting of the disease could be accomplished in a single day,
which may be a departure from reality depending on the testing protocols required.
On the day of migration when the site or network had an 80% or greater
probability of detecting HPAI (i.e., a “likely detection”), we determined how far
the disease had already spread past the monitoring station, as well as the slope of the
1-day change in the contagious/symptomatic proportion of the surviving population
(i.e., the “apparent infection rate”; Van Der Plank 1963). For the former, we
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calculated this based upon the abundance and relative proportion of still-alive
agents that were contagious and located between 215 and 90 from the sampling
point (i.e., “escapees”). Among escapees we calculated the mean and median
distance from the sampling station, as well as the mean HPAI virulence among
contagious agents. In terms of the apparent infection rate occurring at the time of
likely detection, we calculated that value based upon the daily change in the
proportion of the still-alive population that were contagious, since these were the
only diseased individuals that were symptomatic (hence, “apparent”). We then
independently assessed the efficacy of each of the 12 sampling locations to detect
a disease during the early stages of the disease outbreak and then repeated these
same calculations using data based upon 3-day confirming detections. Complete
ABM code used within Agent Analyst/RePast available at: https://github.com/
rossjd/Migration_monitoring_ABM.

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

Distance from Disease Origin (km)

Fig. 17.4 Boxplot distributions of distance from the Siberian population of disease origin among
both total occupants (white bars—grey circles) and contagious occupants (red bars and circles)
over 6-day intervals of the study period. Note the descending scale on the y-axis
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Fig. 17.5 Disease prevalence, infection rates, and mortality metrics across the entire study arena
during the ABM-simulated study period. Cumulative numbers of dead agents (black diamonds) are
plotted along the upper-left axis, proportions of surviving agents that were diseased (orange
triangles) or contagious (red circles) are plotted along the upper-right axis, and day-to-day changes
in the proportion of contagious agents (i.e., the apparent infection rate) are plotted in the lower
panel (blue diamonds). The x-axis is consistent for both panels

3

Results

3.1

Breeding-to-Wintering Ground Connectivity

Displacement data, measured as the minimum Great circle route distance over land
or ocean from the disease origin, indicated a relatively constant migration and
spread of the entire agent population throughout the 90-day simulation period
(Fig. 17.4). These patterns were evident as a linear increase of the median distance
(black bars within white boxplots in Fig. 17.4) and progressively higher variation
within the data (i.e., wider boxplots), respectively. The distribution of contagious
individuals, however, appeared to show a different and less-consistent pattern of
spread. Specifically, the midpoint of contagious individual locations appeared to
spread rapidly outward between Days 42 and 48, which corresponded to the period
of rapid collapse in the disease outbreak (Figs. 17.4 and 17.5). The relative
distribution of contagious individuals then appeared to largely stagnate, as the

444

J.D. Ross et al.

Fig. 17.6 Shifts in spatial distribution of agents (left panels) and disease prevalence/virulence
and host susceptibility (right panels) over three select days: (a, b) Day 23—confirming detection
by monitoring network; (c, d) Day 54—latest day of independent disease confirmation at a
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median displacement distance remained between 3300 and 3550 km from Day
48 onward (Fig. 17.3). These distances correspond to approximately northwestern
Canada, while the central quartiles during this same time period corresponded to
approximately eastern Alaska through western Canada and the Pacific Northwest of
the United States (i.e., 2500 and 5000 km from the disease origin; Figs. 17.1 and
17.6).
Cumulative migratory displacements long enough to have reached the contiguous United States (~4200 km from the disease origin) were first observed among a
handful of agents by Day 12 of the period; though the second quartile of total
survivors did not reach this distance until Day 66 and their median distance did not
exceed this distance until after Day 84 (Fig. 17.4). Among contagious agents, the
total distance of travel first exceeded 4200 km by Day 18, although this was only
one individual. It was not until Day 30 that additional diseased individuals had
progressed far enough to possibly reach the contiguous United States (Fig. 17.4).
Following the rapid geographic shift in symptomatic agent displacement distances
after Day 42, the second quartile of surviving contagious agents overlapped
4200 km by Day 54. Though these agents were still able to normally migrate, the
sudden shift in the distribution was more likely attributable to massive die-offs of
diseased agents at locations closer to the HPAI outbreak origin than to an uptick in
daily migration distances among diseased agents. The median distance of displacement from the HPAI origin site among symptomatic agents never exceed 4200 km;
therefore, by Day 90 the bulk of the contagious population could have never
reached the contiguous United States under this simulated scenario. However,
there were certainly many instances of symptomatic individuals appearing well
within that area (Fig. 17.6c), which could have been sufficient to infect resident
wild bird, domestic fowl, or even human populations.

3.2

Disease Monitoring

Networked Stations Using a 12-station network of monitoring stations throughout
northwestern North America, our model detected with a 80% probability the first
contagious agent on Day 18 of the migration period. By this point: only 0.16 and
0.56% of the surviving population were contagious or at least infected, respectively.
ä
Fig. 17.6 (continued) monitoring station; and (e, f) Day 90—last day of simulation period. Lefthand maps indicate: 1000 km distance intervals (white rings) from disease origin (red dot);
locations of uninfected agents (purple points), infected agents (in increasing abundance: blue,
yellow, and orange points), and starting populations of the nine uninfected populations (green
dots). Right-hand panels summarize within 1000 km distance bins from Siberian disease origin:
proportionate abundance and mean disease virulence among contagious (dashed black and red
lines, respectively) and early-infected agents (dotted black and orange lines, respectively), and
mean susceptibility among contagious (red bars), early-infected (orange bars), and uninfected
agents (blue bars)

Name

Combined network:
1
Minto, AK:
2
Tazlina Lake, AK:
3
Katalla, AK:
4
Inuvik, YU:
5
Laberge, YU:
6
Chilkoot Inlet, AK:
7
Rubyrock, BC:
8
Nimpkish, BC:
9
Slave Lake, AB:
10
Columbia, WA:
11
Pend Oreille, ID:
12
Bear River, UT:

#

A. Single detection
Station

n/a
65.209
61.900
60.257
68.278
61.287
59.196
54.704
50.438
55.471
46.924
48.101
41.434

Latitude

n/a
−149.183
−146.464
−144.163
−134.220
−135.176
−135.042
−125.223
−127.040
−115.456
−119.325
−116.434
−112.286

Longitude
18
29
22
26
27
27
27
35
37
38
41
43
50

Day of
80% +
detection
114,986
316,909
74,395
72,388
104,366
54,721
38,141
23,479
14,979
13,623
7067
8357
3074

Total
number
727
896
607
669
1079
687
638
725
731
955
734
812
831

Mean
708
830
485
563
1067
602
541
639
633
891
657
732
797

Median

All escapees
Distance (km)

80
5728
138
383
642
284
180
719
583
519
387
685
228

Total
Number
0.07
1.81
0.19
0.53
0.62
0.52
0.47
3.06
3.89
3.81
5.48
8.20
7.42

Percent
of total

Contagious escapees

730
800
452
490
999
537
470
519
470
751
501
566
550

Mean
716
785
417
396
1,022
492
395
474
388
706
418
522
518

Median

Distance (km)

0.35
0.39
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.38
0.37
0.41
0.44
0.43
0.45
0.46
0.48

Mean
pop
virulence

0.04
0.61
0.10
0.28
0.36
0.36
0.36
2.69
3.99
4.67
4.98
1.37
−3.27

Specieswide
apparent
infection
rate (%)

Table 17.2 Summaries of simulated monitoring station locations and day of likely disease detection (with associated distances escapees had moved past the
station and species-wide apparent infection rate) for both single detections (A) and confirming detections (B)
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Name

Combined network:
1
Minto, AK:
2
Tazlina Lake, AK:
3
Katalla, AK:
4
Inuvik, YU:
5
Laberge, YU:
6
Chilkoot Inlet, AK:
7
Rubyrock, BC:
8
Nimpkish, BC:
9
Slave Lake, AB:
10
Columbia, WA:
11
Pend Oreille, ID:
12
Bear River, UT:

#

n/a
65.209
61.900
60.257
68.278
61.287
59.196
54.704
50.438
55.471
46.924
48.101
41.434

Latitude

B. 3-day confirmed detection
Station

n/a
−149.183
−146.464
−144.163
−134.220
−135.176
−135.042
−125.223
−127.040
−115.456
−119.325
−116.434
−112.286

Longitude
23
32
27
30
34
30
34
38
40
42
44
46
54

Day of
80% +
detection
206,283
367,180
132,164
111,415
188,393
79,457
87,443
33,260
21,010
20,824
9588
10,524
3966

Total
Number
801
952
704
755
1207
733
760
776
795
1038
806
892
917

Mean
769
870
570
646
1163
639
650
676
700
976
722
813
912

Median

All escapees
Distance (km)

607
15,641
1071
2056
10,328
1182
4093
2494
2128
2364
1106
1469
252

Total
number
0.29
4.26
0.81
1.85
5.48
1.49
4.68
7.50
10.13
11.35
11.54
13.96
6.35

Percent
of total

Contagious escapees

729
840
531
557
1,105
585
559
561
531
825
540
607
669

Mean
732
813
440
487
1,104
532
488
516
451
776
471
563
598

Median

Distance (km)

0.36
0.41
0.38
0.40
0.42
0.39
0.42
0.43
0.44
0.45
0.47
0.47
0.53

Mean
pop
virulence
0.13
1.30
0.36
0.82
2.15
0.82
2.15
4.67
5.47
3.65
−1.63
−6.44
−1.09

Detectionday
apparent
infection
rate (%)
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Furthermore, only 80 contagious agents (0.07% of survivors) had escaped beyond
any monitoring station by this day, although one symptomatic individual had
already reached a point 2320 km ESE past the northwestern-most monitoring
station (Minto, AK) and diseased escapees were located an average of 730 km
from that station. The mean virulence among strains that had passed at least one
monitoring station by Day 18 remained relatively low at 0.35 (Table 17.2A).
If at least one more confirming detection of the disease within a 3-day period was
required, then the network of stations was 80% likely to confirm the disease by
Day 23. By this point, 0.56 and 2.02% of the surviving population were contagious
or at least infected, respectively, and 607 contagious individuals (0.29% of
survivors) were already present beyond at least one monitoring station. Interestingly, contagious individuals were spread similarly to Day 18, with the furthest
present 2042 km SSE from Minto, AK, diseased escapees located an average of
729 km beyond that station, and mean virulence remained relatively low at 0.36
(Table 17.2B). Most of the contagious agents were still contained within or near
Siberia or Alaska on Day 23 and the bulk of diseased individuals appeared to be
centered on the Bering Strait area (Fig. 17.6a).
Individual Stations Under the scenario of independently operating stations, the
rapidity of detecting the disease was understandably lower than if the stations were
in constant communication as a network. Certain stations appeared to be more
likely to detect the disease than others in the vicinity, particularly in Alaska where
the station closest to the Siberian disease origin (Minto, AK) was slower to detect or
confirm the outbreak (Days 29 and 32, respectively) than locations further south and
east (Table 17.2). This would have meant that this station wouldn’t have reported
the outbreak until it was well into the acceleration period (i.e., apparent infection
rate rising by 0.61–1.30% per day, depending on detection criteria). In contrast, the
nearest station to Minto, AK—located only 400 km SSE at Tazlina Lake, AK—
rapidly detected the disease outbreak and appeared to do so at an early stage of
disease acceleration (i.e., apparent infection rate was rising at only 0.10–0.36% per
day, depending on detection criteria; Table 17.2). The primary difference between
these stations was that Minto, AK, is located far inland (W of Fairbanks) while
Tazlina Lake, AK, is nearer the coastline (NE of Anchorage; Fig. 17.1). Within the
structure of the ABM, these characteristics could have favored greater amounts of
traffic near the latter station, which would have promoted greater probability of
disease transmission within increasingly dense stopover populations.
Across all stations, there was a strong positive correlation between the distance
from the disease origin in Siberia (N62.703, W167.117) and the day of earliest
disease detection, regardless of detection criteria (R2 ¼ 0.92 for either single or
confirming detections; Fig. 17.7). This would be consistent with the disease being
propagated relatively evenly across a broad front that progressed, on average,
between 135 and 145 km per day (calculated from regression slopes for single
and confirming detections, respectively). This rate of disease travel is very unlikely
to be simply mediated by individual movements when one considers that (1) the
migrations of individual waterfowl agents were set to occur on average every
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Fig. 17.7 Linear relationship between the distance of monitoring stations from the Siberian
disease origin (x-axis) and the day of 80%-probable disease detection (inverted y-axis) for
both single detections (grey squares) and confirming detections (black circles). Data from
Minto, AK, are circled to illustrate their relative displacement above the regression line, which
indicates that disease detections were made at this site later than expected given the proximity of
the site to the disease origin

10 days, (2) those movements were selected from a gamma distribution that peaked
at ~330 km and was restricted to a maximum of 1200 km (Fig. 17.3), and (3) the
probability of mortality quickly rose as a function of the number of days infected.
Instead, the most parsimonious explanation is that disease transmission occurred
across a series of individuals that were newly infected at successive stopover sites.
This aligns with Gaidet et al.’s (2010) similar conclusions which were drawn from
actual satellite tracking data among East Asian migratory waterfowl.

3.3

Evolution of Disease Virulence and Host Susceptibility

Much as there was a strong correlation between the distances from the Siberian
HPAI origin to each monitoring station versus the days of disease detection, there
was also a strong positive correlation between the latter and the mean HPAI
virulence among agents that had escaped past each monitoring station. Based
upon a linear regression of these data, we found that HPAI virulence appeared to
consistently rise over time by a factor of þ0.005/day (data not shown). This
increase in virulence among surviving HPAI strains effectively reflects the iterative
selection pressure imposed on the virus over successive stages of mutation and
selection and is likely the result of the following aspects of our ABM: (1) waterfowl
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hosts can develop resistance through exposure and recovery from less-virulent
HPAI strains; (2) clearing the infection is a function of susceptibility and the
virulence of the present HPAI strain; and (3) the probability of mortality quickly
rises as a function of the number of days an agent has been infected.
The increase in mean virulence was not restricted to only those agents that
escaped beyond a given monitoring station; by the time the disease was confirmed
at the last station (Day 54 at Bear River NWR, UT; Table 17.2), the mean virulence
across the 5686 agents contagious on that day was 0.720 and across 4739 earlyinfected but asymptomatic agents the mean virulence was 0.799. At the outset of the
simulation, 112 of 106 agents had been infected with HPAI strains that had a
collective mean virulence of only 0.227.
Reflecting the simulated evolutionary arms race incorporated into the ABM, the
HPAI susceptibility of surviving agents likewise shifted during the simulation; that
is, agents with increasingly lower susceptibility tended to resist the increasingly
more virulent strains. At the outset of the simulation (Day 0), the mean susceptibility across all 106 agents had been 0.793. By Day 54, the mean susceptibility had
fallen to 0.210 among uninfected agents (n ¼ 101,916), 0.404 among early-infected
agents (n ¼ 4739), and 0.536 among contagious agents (n ¼ 5686). Among the
agents dead by Day 54, 821,658 had died while contagious, 27,232 had died when
early infected (Days 1–3), and 38,768 had died without infection (i.e., natural
background mortality).
Sticking with the example of Day 54, our examination of locations of diseased
agents indicated a dispersed distribution along the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain region of North America (Fig. 17.6c). However, when we examined the mean
values of HPAI virulence and susceptibility across this area, we found that
individuals within a band 2000–3000 km from the disease origin possessed quite
virulent strains of the disease, which was counterbalanced by very low susceptibility—especially among uninfected individuals (Fig. 17.6d). At the leading edge of
the disease spread (i.e., 5000 km from HPAI origin), mean susceptibility was high
among all agents, regardless of infection status, which indicates that neither natural
selection on hosts for high resistance nor a widespread acquisition of immunity had
greatly impacted those populations by Day 54. Across all but the smallest 1000 km
bins, a consistent pattern was observed for mean susceptibility—that contagious,
then early-infected, and then uninfected agents showed stepwise decreases in their
levels of susceptibility to HPAI (re)infection. This appeared to fit within the
construct of our ABM, wherein the host’s susceptibility is roughly proportional to
the inverse probability of clearing an infection (hence the higher susceptibility
among contagious agents) as well as the probability of being infected after exposure
(hence the elevated rate among early-infected agents relative to the
uninfected pool).
By the end of our simulation period on Day 90, the suppression of susceptibility
remained, though it had shifted further away from the disease origin and peaked at
the 4000–5000 km range (Fig. 17.6f). Mean virulence had risen to very high levels
across the arena, though the proportion of agents that were diseased had fallen to
very low levels. At the end of the simulation period, the original population of one
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million agents had been reduced to 90,615. This is a very high mortality rate and, as
such, may point to the present ABM as a “worst-case scenario” for the emergence
and pathology of the simulated HPAI strain. Of the remaining agents, 14,395 had
ceased migration at rather broadly spaced wintering locations generally in the
mid-continental USA (i.e., beyond 6000 km from the disease origin; Fig. 17.6e).
The mean virulence and susceptibility among the few infected wintering agents,
either contagious (n ¼ 19) or not (n ¼ 20), was 0.810 and 0.619, respectively. Mean
susceptibility among uninfected wintering agents, although relatively low at 0.362,
had not dropped to the levels seen in areas where the disease had been more
prevalent (i.e., 3000–5000 km from the origin; Fig. 17.6).

4

Discussion

The exercise we have presented in this chapter was aimed at the general topic of
tracking large-scale connectivity among individual animals, and the diseases they
carry, as they actively move through the aerosphere to traverse vast landscapes. The
ABM used in our theoretical scenario is broadly based upon generalized waterfowl
biology, including migration behaviors, conspecific attraction, landscape usage,
and HPAI transmission dynamics. Though flight-driven connectivity clearly has
the possibility to influence evolutionary and ecological processes related to the
species itself, such point-to-point links can drive other ecological processes such as
the transfer of energy, nutrients, parasites, or diseases.
A realistically parameterized agent-based model can allow the study of different
aspects of natural processes, such as bird migration or disease transmission, perhaps
even using the same simulation output in a similar fashion to how scientists of
various disciplines could each study different aspects of a natural system. A major
advantage of the ABM simulation framework is that we may readily alter input
parameters independently, which allows for sensitivity analyses regarding how
each factor might disproportionately affect the model output—something that is
not easily achieved or even possible under natural or rare circumstances. Even in
cases where the input parameters used in ABMs are approximations or
generalizations, such as in our case, the scenario evaluations possible through
individual-based modeling can still provide valuable biological insights that can
inform further data collection, modeling, or management planning (MacPherson
and Gras 2016).

4.1

Simulating Migratory Connectivity: Biological Insights

Movement through the aerosphere using powered flight is the fastest way that
vertebrate animals can naturally traverse large geographic distances (Alerstam
2003, 2011), allowing for transcontinental transmission of biomass over relatively
short periods of time. In the example presented in this chapter, the simulated
migration of one million generalized waterfowl from Siberia to the southern USA
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occurred in some cases within 3–4 weeks. Such rapid movements are not unusual
among migratory bird species (Fuller et al. 1998; Kjellén et al. 2001; Alerstam
2003), especially waterfowl (Green et al. 2002; Gaidet et al. 2010; Prosser et al.
2011), though cross-continental, longitudinal movements of individual land birds
remain only sparsely studied (e.g., Bairlein et al. 2012).
Long-distance migration facilitated the spread of our simulated highly pathogenic virus. However, migration of the simulated waterfowl host was not in
complete lockstep with the dispersal of the HPAI outbreak. In part, this was because
of the time required for an HPAI outbreak to achieve critical mass and partly
because of apparent selective forces acting on both host and virus. With respect
to the former, our model indicated that communicable agents remained rare and the
mean virulence of HPAI strains they carried remained relatively low during the first
18 simulated days (Fig. 17.4), by which time nearly half of the total population had
moved beyond Siberia (i.e., displacements >1100 km). Even by Day 23, when the
disease had spread across Alaska and had been confirmed by the simulated monitoring network, the mean virulence of the disease remained modest (Table 17.2B),
although sufficient to readily infect the still quite-susceptible population of agents
(Fig. 17.6b).
Subsequent to Day 23, when the HPAI became rapidly more pathogenic and
prevalent, the rampant buildup of diseased occupants corresponded to widespread
mortality that ultimately resulted in the death of >90% of the entire agent population (Fig. 17.5). A high proportion of surviving agents at distances >4000 km from
the disease origin were contagious by Day 54 (7.5%; Fig. 17.6d), which suggests
that the virus had disproportionately spread outward during the outbreak phase. The
median location of uninfected birds likewise continuously progressed further from
the disease origin (Fig. 17.4). However, at no point in our simulation did the median
distance of contagious individuals from the disease origin spread exceed 3600 km.
In effect, the center point of the disease population appeared to stall after being
transmitted only part of the way to wintering grounds. This supports the interesting
possibility that migration might initially help but eventually hinder the spread of
disease (Altizer et al. 2011), especially when it comes to the geographic extent of
HPAI spread (Lam et al. 2012). Such data could only be gleaned from studying the
individual interactions between disease and host (Morales et al. 2010) and are an
improvement upon well-founded but limited models of disease spread based on
very coarse-scale range maps and movements (e.g., Peterson et al. 2009).
The apparent selective interactions in our ABM between host and disease seem
to have driven another interesting dynamic—that the surviving populations
emerged with greatly elevated levels of resistance (inverse susceptibility) or virulence, respectively. Since we had simulated only a single-species host for HPAI,
this meant that equilibrium was eventually reached and the disease returned to
relatively low incidence among the surviving hosts (Figs. 17.5 and 17.6). In this
respect, the HPAI population had been distilled down to nearly its most potent form
(i.e., virulence ¼ 1.0) as a result of selective feedback during stepwise migratory
jumps. One may predict that possible alternative hosts for HPAI encountered at
points further south could be quite susceptible to such a highly virulent strain of the
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disease. Such a situation could present a serious risk of rapid infection and widespread mortality in these new hosts, even if there was some degree of native HPAI
resistance present. From a competitive standpoint, this could give migratory species
an evolutionary advantage on wintering grounds. From an economic standpoint,
this could mean that transmission of this HPAI strain into domestic stocks could
bring widespread devastation. Such scenarios are possible and warrant further
examination using ABMs which incorporate data from targeted quantification
studies, such as challenge assays of susceptibility, exposure, infection, and recovery/clearance (Pantin-Jackwood et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2006, 2008).

4.2

ABM-Informed Disease Monitoring and Mitigation

Of significant human health and economic concern is whether confirmed disease
detections could be made early enough during an outbreak to prevent further spread
and allow effective mitigation efforts within already infected populations (Brown
and Stallknecht 2008). Since asymptomatic carriers (e.g., early-infected or resistant
individuals) might fly through the aerosphere rapidly and with fewer barriers, the
efficacy of a disease monitoring and mitigation program could be drastically altered
by delays of just a matter of days (DeLiberto et al. 2011). In our example, the twelve
hypothetical monitoring stations distributed from Alaska to Utah varied widely in
how quickly they were likely to detect the disease. This pattern was driven almost
entirely by the station’s distance from the disease origin. However, in the case of the
station at Minto, AK, detection and confirmation of the disease lagged far behind
the nearest station, Tazlina Lake, AK, despite the former being located closest to
the disease origin (Fig. 17.1). The comparative delay of 5 (single detection) to
7 days (confirmed detection; Table 17.2; Fig. 17.7) meant that by the time the
disease would have been independently reported at the Minto station, AK, the
disease was well into an outbreak, with apparent infection rates 6.2 to 3.6 higher
(respectively) than when HPAI was detected at Tazlina Lake (Table 17.2 and
Fig. 17.5). Losing this amount of time during the critical early stages of an HPAI
outbreak is likely to undermine the efficacy of subsequent mitigation efforts to stem
further disease spread (Brown and Stallknecht 2008). Under this scenario, the
resources allocated to the Minto monitoring station, AK, would have been much
more effective at other sites, such as closer to coastal waterways where the agents
appeared to accumulate (Fig. 17.6).
A communicating network of monitoring stations certainly improved the ability
to monitor for detectable symptoms of a disease outbreak, though with the caveat
that disease detection and information sharing were both instantaneous. Not surprisingly, we found that the early warning efficacy of the network was driven by
data generated at only one or two stations in Alaska. Depending on our confidence
in the parameters of the model, we could be inclined to say that prioritization of
resources should be given to these stations if we wanted to maximize our probability of detecting and confirming a disease during the earliest stages of an outbreak.
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However, by reducing the geographic spread of monitoring stations, agencies
would have limited capacity to track HPAI dynamics over the course of its invasion
of North America. We saw from our simulation that the bulk of the disease outbreak
never progressed much beyond Canada. However, our model also indicated that the
HPAI achieved a very high level of virulence along the migratory route. Tracing
such patterns so that the impending outcome can be more accurately predicted
could be critical to avoid an over- or understatement of risk. Such inaccuracies
could undermine regulatory agencies’ ability to elicit public responses in the face of
subsequent disease threats, especially as it pertains to reducing potential avenues of
host switching into humans.

4.3

Field Testing and Applying ABMs

Field monitoring is important as a way to continually refine predictive models, as
well as to validate the predictions being made in those same models. Such on-theground efforts may also be the most effective way to monitor migratory populations
for evidence of communicable diseases, in particular those of potential human
economic or health impact such as avian influenza (Wobeser 2013). Our model
made relatively static assumptions regarding the detectability of contagious
individuals relative to asymptomatic or uninfected individuals and that detectability
would increasingly rise in smaller populations. However, human observers would
likely have much greater intuition about changes in the norm at their sites and could
provide the capacity to rapidly adjust monitoring efforts in the face of an emerging
disease outbreak. In turn, they could benefit from ABM simulations that focus their
search efforts into areas of highest risk for disease appearance and/or escape (e.g.,
disease may be more likely to slip by at lower-density stopover sites).
For management agencies tasked with preventing potential human impacts from
animal-borne diseases, there exists a delicate balance between reducing alpha error
(i.e., missing a disease when it is present) at the expense of increased beta error (i.e.,
false warnings of an impending outbreak). Yet, detecting a disease before it breaks
out across large geographic areas, as well as prescribing the appropriate mitigation
efforts, could prove impossible without sufficient foresight. Modeling scenarios of
biological connectivity from real-world observations could be a powerful, economical, and effective tool to forecast plausible events like the simplified disease
transmission and evolution model presented in this chapter. Such information
may provide a critical head start in developing and testing potential mitigation
strategies. Not only could these models predict what metrics to track during an
emerging outbreak or mitigation effort, but they could also define what natural
variation may be expected, so that the process can be evaluated in real time to
inform where shifts in approach may be needed. It could also pinpoint critical points
in the detection and reporting infrastructure, such as a need to rapidly but accurately
test for disease within fresh samples at field sites.
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Once a disease is detected, possible mitigation strategies could encompass a
suite of labor-intensive, socially disruptive, or fiscally expensive management
techniques that would be publicly unpopular if they were not objectively supported
by a predictive framework. ABMs can repeatedly gauge the probability that, for
instance, waterfowl migration would link subsequent stopover nodes within a
disease network and what outcomes may be anticipated from various mitigation
approaches. These data could provide managers the necessary information to
justifiably focus their actions where they could most likely have the intended effect
of stopping the disease outbreak. Again, such models could be continually refined
and tested as the real-world situation changes and could be accomplished in the
field on laptop computers.

4.4

Refining our Migration Connectivity and Disease
Monitoring ABM

As with any model, the accuracy of the ABM simulations depends upon the realism
of the rules and parameters used in their construction. Our example was, after all, a
simulated case study which generalized the migratory characteristics of typical
waterfowl species (see Sect. 2). The worst-case scenario presented contrasted prior
evaluations of HPAI incidence among migratory birds crossing the Bering Strait,
which found little evidence of the disease (Ip et al. 2008; Winker et al. 2007). It may
be that avian-borne diseases could enter a continent through a number of different
pathways (Peterson et al. 2007), and revisiting our ABM in light of contrasting
ground observations is simply another way that this tool can be refined to simulate
increasingly realistic scenarios.
Furthermore, our ABM did not account for other possible factors that would
likely affect the interplay between migration biology and HPAI disease dynamics.
For example, missing were possible mediating factors such as competition between
low and highly pathogenic influenza strains (Bourouiba et al. 2011), behavioral
avoidance of symptomatic conspecifics (Loehle 1995), stopover duration relative to
disease shedding (Gaidet et al. 2010; Feare 2010), impairments among diseased
individuals (van Gils et al. 2007; Kuiken 2013), or a full parameterization of
density-dependent interactions, especially within small groups (Runge and Marra
2005). On the other hand, the ABM also omitted possible disease-promoting factors
such as viral tenacity in the environment (Stallknecht and Brown 2009), crossspecies transmission (Kilpatrick et al. 2006; Boyce et al. 2009; Altizer et al. 2011),
and in-flight stopover/aggregation decisions (Alerstam 2011). Variables likely to
have context-dependent implications for disease spread, such as seasonal or daily
variation in stopover suitability (Bauer and Hoye 2014) or host energetic condition
(Beldomenico and Begon 2009; Arsnoe et al. 2011), were also not considered in the
ABM, and such factors could have drastic effects depending on their timing and
spatial patterning along the migratory route. With respect to the monitoring and
detection of the disease, here our ABM also disregarded possible extenuating
variables, such as interobserver or station variability in search efficiency, local

456

J.D. Ross et al.

environmental conditions, irregular schedules, and asymmetric detectability of
symptomatic individuals. In Box 17.1, we outline these possible additions to our
ABM, with brief descriptions of how each might affect the model outcomes.
Box 17.1 Outline of possible extensions of the ABM presented in the chapter
that would incorporate increasing realism into the simulation. This list is not
intended to be encompassing but a glimpse into how ABM approaches can
be as complex as desired (though at the possible expense of resolvability
among possible independent variable effects).

Relevance to host
Candidate
migration or
variables
susceptibility
Alternate transmission pathways
Cross-species
Community
composition at
stopover sites and
interspecific
interactions may be
important

Continental
entry points

Multiple pathways
by which species
might cross, entering
different migratory
pathways

Environmental
deposition and
uptake

Susceptible
individuals may not
be able to avoid
exposure through
behavioral avoidance
of symptomatic birds
Refined monitoring network
Variable effort
Stopover
and observer
aggregations could
effects
be disrupted by
observer approach;
potentially exposes
sick individuals that
cannot escape
East-Asian
monitoring sites

Area of flyway
overlap and molting
grounds; provide

Relevance to disease
transmission or
detection

Potential data
sources (with
examples)

Domestic fowl may
be important stores
and sources of
pathogenic disease
(Kilpatrick et al.
2006); passerines are
overlooked as
potential carriers of
avian influenza
(Fuller et al. 2010)
Greater range of
possible disease
entry corridors

Genetic tests of
cross-species
infections (Lam et al.
2012); disease
surveys across
multiple species
(Winker et al. 2007);
species association
data

Leading edge of
migration may be
exposed to latent
virus spores at
stopover sites

Increased lag period
between disease
arrival and detection
by site monitors;
elevated
conspicuousness of
symptomatic birds
Monitoring effort
centered closer to the
known locations of

Circumcontinental
monitoring networks
(Peterson et al.
2007); integrative
individual tracking
studies (Bowlin
et al. 2010)
Viral tenacity studies
at points across the
migratory corridor
(Stallknecht and
Brown 2009)

Existing monitoring
station schedules and
coverages (Harris
et al. 2015);
experimental
detection
probabilities using
test drills
Existing monitoring
effort distributions in
East Asia (Okazaki

(continued)
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Box 17.1 (continued)
data on initial
demography,
energetic condition,
and community
composition
Demographically specific metrics
Navigation
Age, sex, size, and
ability
health impacts on the
speed and route
efficiency of
individuals

Disease
pathology

Age, sex, size, and
health impacts on the
disease susceptibility
of individuals

Densitydependent
interactions

Density elevates
agonistic interactions
and redistribution to
suboptimal
locations; predation
risk tracks
population density
Condition-dependent factors
Disease
Migratory birds may
susceptibility
be more susceptible
to disease during
molting periods or
under other stressors
(Feare 2010; Fuller
et al. 1998)
Functional
impairment

Migratory
movements affected
by infections, even
when asymptomatic
(van Gils et al. 2007)

Migration biology factors
In-flight
Migratory birds are
decisions
capable of
continually assessing
underlying
landscapes for

recent HPAI
outbreaks
(Alexander and
Brown 2009; Prosser
et al. 2011)

et al. 2000; Xu et al.
2013)

Certain demographic
classes may be more
likely to wander
further or stopover
longer, which could
affect exposure and
recovery dynamics
Virus transmittal
may be aided or
muted depending
upon the
demographic
composition of the
stopover population
Increased disease
competition within
dense populations as
low-pathogenic
strains may inoculate
hosts (Bourouiba
et al. 2011)

Individual tracking
studies using satellite
transmitters (Gilbert
et al. 2010) or
geolocators (Bridge
et al. 2011)
Challenge studies of
different age classes,
species, or sexes
(Pantin-Jackwood
et al. 2007)

Behavioral ecology
in migrant
aggregations (Runge
and Marra 2005);
time-allocation
budgets (Morales
et al. 2010)

Virus transmittal
may be aided or
muted depending
upon the condition of
the exposed
individual
(Beldomenico and
Begon 2009)
Disease has
relatively narrow
window to infect
hosts and spread to
other populations
(Gaidet et al. 2010)

Condition-dependent
challenge studies
(Arsnoe et al. 2011)

Greater potential for
disease spread within
attractive stopover
habitats and among

Real-time individual
stopover choices
relative to dynamic
landscape factors
and ground-truthed

Test physiological
effects among
infected birds
(Kuiken 2013); track
in-flight physiology
(Gumus et al. 2015)

(continued)
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Box 17.1 (continued)
conspecific
aggregations or
suitable habitat
Fat stores and
Migrants will be
replenishment
constrained to
stopover for a
duration inversely
related to habitat
quality
Spatiotemporal landscape variability
Seasonal shifts
Climate-mediated
in resources
resource
competition; greater
motivation for
migration toward
suitable wintering
habitat (see
Chap. 16)
Daily weather
Locally mediated
patterns
resource
competition; dictates
exodus, pathway,
and stopover
decisions (see
Chaps. 8 and 12)
Host-disease evolutionary models
Viral mutability Greater
and balancing
parameterization of
selection
host responses to
viral exposure,
including
immunocompetent
plasticity
(Beldomenico and
Begon 2009)

4.5

conspecific
groupings

population metrics
(Kays et al. 2015)

Prolonged stopovers,
particularly
low-quality habitats,
could promote
disease exposure

Monitor individual
stopover duration
relative to
underlying habitat
(Takekawa et al.
2010)

Virus spread must
match host’s speed
toward wintering
ground;
spatiotemporal
patterns in stressors
promoting infection

Incorporate seasonal
shifts in population
distributions and
resource availability
across the migratory
season (Bauer and
Hoye 2014)

Cycle of host
immigration and
emigration at
stopover sites may
ensure a constant
supply of potential
hosts

Relate archived
weather data to
existing daily
stopover site data for
numbers and
diversity of birds
infected (Winker and
Gibson 2010)

Underlying genetic
variation and
spatiotemporal
mutation
probabilities can
drive the pathology
of avian influenza
disease (Boyce et al.
2009)

Incorporate complex
algorithms
associated with
competition-driven
evolution
(DeAngelis and
Mooij 2005)

Future Directions for Aeroecological Network Analyses
Using ABMs

Biological processes occurring in the aerosphere are diverse and mediated by a
plethora of intrinsic and external factors. The application of ABMs to such a largescale and complex system will necessarily require increasingly greater parameterization based upon real-world measurements. Fortunately, as evinced by the wealth
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of knowledge presented in the other chapters of this volume, researchers are
continuing to increase our knowledge base of ecological processes occurring in
the aerosphere, especially as we gain the capability to track how individuals move
through this medium and the resulting impacts on population connectivity and
landscape permeability.
Aeroecology often revolves around the collection and analysis of so-called big
data. While the analysis of such large datasets is daunting, access to increasingly
powerful computational hardware is allowing us to fully leverage the power of
ABM framework to deconstruct, model, and ultimately understand the complex
processes underlying the airspace oddity that is life on the wing. For example,
ABMs could readily be applied to broad-scale ecological questions such as the
latitudinal redistribution of energy and nutrient resources by migratory animals
(Bauer and Hoye 2014). That said, there does exist the potential to
overparameterize an ABM at the expense of resolvability among the rapidly
expanding realm of variables and interactions. The advantage that the ABM
simulation framework allows in isolating specific variables for the purpose of
conducting sensitivity analyses could easily be swamped by an overabundance of
independent variables. A simple ABM, such as we’ve presented in this chapter, can
provide valuable insights even when it has omitted some variables or has not
incorporated all related data during its parameterization (MacPherson and Gras
2016).
The powered flight of animals can rapidly and extensively connect biological
communities, including pathogens, across the face of the world. A more thorough
understanding of how this connectivity operates can have profound ecological and
anthrosocial implications. This is especially true within the modern era, as wild
animals are increasingly forced into close association with rapidly growing human
population centers and the concentrated animal feeding operations that have
become the primary source of domesticated food. How might the future
aeroecological patterns affect such human–wildlife conflicts? We believe that
ABMs show promise to bind together what we are learning about the global-scale
and circannual patterns that comprise aeroecology, as we continue to construct a
mosaicked understanding of this yet-emerging scientific discipline.
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Peterson AT, Benz BW, Papeş M (2007) Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza: entry pathways
into North America via bird migration. PLoS One 2:e261. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0000261
Peterson AT, Andersen MJ, Bodbyl-Roels S et al (2009) A prototype forecasting system for birdborne disease spread in North America based on migratory bird movements. Epidemics
1:240–249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epidem.2009.11.003
Prosser DJ, Takekawa JY, Newman SH et al (2009) Satellite-marked waterfowl reveal migratory
connection between H5N1 outbreak areas in China and Mongolia. Ibis (Lond 1859)
151:568–576. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1474-919X.2009.00932.x
Prosser DJ, Cui P, Takekawa JY et al (2011) Wild bird migration across the Qinghai-Tibetan
plateau: a transmission route for highly pathogenic H5N1. PLoS One 6:e17622
Pybus OG, Fraser C, Rambaut A (2013) Evolutionary epidemiology: preparing for an age of
genomic plenty. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 368:540–550
Robinson WD, Bowlin MS, Bisson I et al (2010) Integrating concepts and technologies to advance
the study of bird migration. Front Ecol Environ 8:354–361. https://doi.org/10.1890/080179
Runge M, Marra P (2005) Modeling seasonal interactions in the population dynamics of migratory
birds. In: Greenberg R, Marra PP (eds) Birds of two worlds: the ecology and evolution of
migration. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp 375–390
Scallan E (2007) Activities, achievements, and lessons learned during the first 10 years of the
foodborne diseases active surveillance network: 1996–2005. Clin Infect Dis 44:718–725.
https://doi.org/10.1086/511648
Shariatinajafabadi M, Wang T, Skidmore AK et al (2014) Migratory herbivorous waterfowl track
satellite-derived green wave index. PLoS One 9:e108331
Si Y, Xin Q, de Boer WF et al (2015) Do arctic breeding geese track or overtake a green wave
during spring migration? Sci Rep 5:8749
Silkavute P, Tung DX, Jongudomsuk P (2013) Sustaining a regional emerging infectious disease
research network: a trust-based approach. Emerg Health Threats J 6. https://doi.org/10.3402/
ehtj.v6i0.19957
Stallknecht DE, Brown JD (2009) Tenacity of avian influenza viruses. Rev Sci Tech 28:59–67
Sutherland GD, Harestad AS, Price K, Lertzman KP (2000) Scaling of natal dispersal distances in
terrestrial birds and mammals. Conserv Ecol 4:16
Takekawa JY, Newman SH, Xiao X et al (2010) Migration of waterfowl in the East Asian Flyway
and spatial relationship to HPAI H5N1 outbreaks. Avian Dis 54:466–476. https://doi.org/10.
1637/8914-043009-Reg.1
Takekawa JY, Prosser DJ, Collins BM et al (2013) Movements of wild ruddy shelducks in the
Central Asian Flyway and their spatial relationship to outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian
influenza H5N1. Viruses 5:2129–2152. https://doi.org/10.3390/v5092129
Tan K-X, Jacob SA, Chan K-G, Lee L-H (2015) An overview of the characteristics of the novel
avian influenza A H7N9 virus in humans. Front Microbiol 6:1–11. https://doi.org/10.3389/
fmicb.2015.00140
Tang W, Bennett DA (2010) Agent-based modeling of animal movement: a review. Geogr
Compass 4:682–700. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2010.00337.x
Taubenberger JK, Kash JC (2016) Influenza virus evolution, host adaptation, and pandemic
formation. Cell Host Microbe 7:440–451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chom.2010.05.009
Taylor PD, Fahrig L, Henein K, Merriam G (1993) Connectivity is a vital element of landscape
structure. Oikos 68:571–573. https://doi.org/10.2307/3544927
Van Der Plank JE (1963) Plant diseases: epidemics and control. Academic, New York

464

J.D. Ross et al.

van Gils JA, Munster VJ, Radersma R et al (2007) Hampered foraging and migratory performance
in swans infected with low-pathogenic avian influenza A virus. PLoS One 2:e184. https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000184
von R€onn JAC, Shafer ABA, Wolf JBW (2016) Disruptive selection without evolution across a
migratory divide. Mol Ecol. https://doi.org/10.1111/mec.13521
Wagner MM, Tsui F-C, Espino JU et al (2001) The emerging science of very early detection of
disease outbreaks. J Public Heal Manag Pract 7:51–59
WCS/CIESIN – Wildlife Conservation Society and Center for International Earth Science Information Network (2005) Last of the Wild Data Version 2 (LWP-2): Global human footprint
dataset
(geographic).
http://www.cec.org/Atlas/Files/Human_Influence_Terrestrial/
HumanInfluenceTerrestrial_Layer_Package_GRID.zip. Accessed 20 Sept 2013
Wiens JA (1976) Population responses to patchy environments. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 7:81–120
Winker K, Gibson DD (2010) The Asia-to-America influx of avian influenza wild bird hosts is
large. Avian Dis 54:477–482. https://doi.org/10.1637/9192-874109-DIGEST.1
Winker K, McCracken KG, Gibson DD et al (2007) Movements of birds and avian influenza from
Asia into Alaska. Emerg Infect Dis 13:547–552. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1304.061072
Wobeser GA (2013) Investigation and management of disease in wild animals. Springer Science
and Business Media, New York
Xu C, Havers F, Wang L et al (2013) Monitoring avian influenza A(H7N9) virus through national
influenza-like illness surveillance, China. Emerg Infect Dis J 19:1289. https://doi.org/10.3201/
eid1908.130662
Yang Y, Halloran ME, Sugimoto JD, Longini IM (2007) Detecting human-to-human transmission
of avian influenza A (H5N1). Emerg Infect Dis 13:1348–1353. https://doi.org/10.3201/
eid1309.070111
Zink RM (1996) Comparative phylogeography in North American birds. Evolution 50:308–317.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2410802

